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23 August 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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Communist China - Ghana: Communist China's grant of an interest-free credit of nearly \$20,000,000 to Ghana points up a major Chinese foreign policy goal of winning support among the new African states. In addition to the credit, China and Ghana concluded several other agreements during President Nkrumah's visit to China from 14-19 August, including

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a friendship treaty, a trade agreement, and a cultural cooperation pact. Elsewhere in Africa, Peiping has previously granted a credit of \$25,000,000 to Guinea, pledged aid to the Mali Government, and extended financial support to the Algerian rebels and the Stanleyville Congo regime.

Nkrumah visited the USSR prior to his arrival in China and received assurances of increased technical assistance and trade. He has now returned to the Soviet Union, possibly for further economic negotiations. [redacted]

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Dominican Republic: [President Balaguer told the American consul on 21 August that increasing pressures from the Dominican military may force him to resign. He said the officer corps is determined to halt his liberalization program and is demanding that the government reimpose the "old controls and system." Balaguer, who appeared more depressed than the consul had ever seen him, said flatly that he would resign rather than submit to the military demands. The President evaded questions on General Ramfis Trujillo's position, but the consul got the impression that Ramfis is "at least going along" with the officers pressuring Balaguer. Earlier this month, Ramfis told the consul that unrest was becoming extensive in the armed forces, that Balaguer did not understand the military or command their respect, and that the]

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[redacted] current transitional period could be effected more easily under a military regime.] [redacted]

[redacted] (Backup, Page 11)

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Sudan: The 21 August clash between Sudanese police and demonstrators of the influential Ansar religious sect may force a showdown between the military regime and opposition elements who have recently been agitating for a return to civilian government. The head of the Ansar sect, Siddiq al-Mahdi, who is also the most important figure in the opposition, has been negotiating with the military rulers for a peaceful transition to civilian government, despite protests from other opposition figures that the government is using the negotiations as a stalling tactic. The Mahdi may feel that this latest police action, which resulted in the death of 12 Ansar youths as well as several policemen, has placed him in a position where he must make a vigorous anti-regime move or lose the confidence of his followers. [redacted]

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Chinese Aid to Ghana

The credit agreement with Ghana, like the one signed with Guinea last year, does not specify projects to be aided by the Chinese but states that the credit will be used over the next five years for technical assistance and training and for purchases of machinery and equipment. Specific construction projects and training programs are to be negotiated later. Repayment of the credit, which will not begin until 1971 and will be spread over a 10-year period, will be made either in commodities or in convertible currency. The agreement brings the total of Sino-Soviet bloc economic aid to Ghana to nearly \$110,000,000.

Sino-Ghanaian trade in 1960 amounted to only \$4,345,000 and accounted for less than 1 percent of total Ghanaian trade in that year. Under the five-year trade agreement, however, commerce between the two countries is planned to reach a level of \$22,400,000 annually and to include Chinese shipments of machinery, chemicals, metals, textiles, and foodstuffs, and Ghanaian exports of cocoa beans, peanuts, coconut oil, hides and skins, and industrial diamonds. Specific information on the value of individual commodities to be exchanged was not announced but presumably trade will consist primarily of cocoa beans from Ghana and textiles and light industrial goods from China. Such trade would be advantageous to both countries but particularly to Ghana, which has been actively seeking additional markets for its cocoa.

Nkrumah's visit to Peiping has apparently done much to bolster the relationship between the two countries; Chinese Chief of State Liu Shao-chi termed the visit a "complete success." The Ghana leader was received by Peiping's top leaders, including Mao Tse-tung. As he had done in other bloc capitals visited during his current tour, Nkrumah expressed his support for Peiping's right to UN membership and for reorganization of the UN.

This new credit to Ghana brings total Chinese aid to underdeveloped countries outside the bloc to \$378,000,000, of which less than one fifth has been drawn to date, mostly by Indonesia and Cambodia. The largest single Chinese economic credits, \$84,000,000 and \$60,000,000, were extended to Burma and Cuba respectively.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Military Pressures May Force Dominican
President's Resignation

The freedom currently being permitted opposition elements in the Dominican Republic follows a generation of enforced political quiet under the longest and most ruthless tyranny in recent Latin American history. Hostility toward the armed forces is widespread in the opposition, which includes most business and professional people. Though moderate leaders try to restrain their followers, there have been frequent public provocations of the military. Many military officers consequently feel their positions are directly threatened by the new political liberties inherent in the President's liberalization program.

On 20 August, at least two opposition leaders were killed in Santiago, the country's second largest city, either by aroused army or police officers acting independently or by mobs organized and directed by the military. The killings, which followed similar deaths in the north coast town of Sosua a week earlier, have led most businesses in Santiago to close in protest, according to information reaching the US Consulate on 21 August. The moderate National Civic Union has publicly accused "the authorities" of the murders, and many Dominicans appear convinced that the era of police repression and brutality is returning.

General Ramfis Trujillo told the consul on 21 August that incidents like those in Santiago and Sosua are to be expected as the opposition "grows stronger and incites against the military." He added that if there are attacks on military installations, "worse things will happen." Trujillo, whose past support of Balaguer has been vital, now appears in the opinion of the consul to be unprepared to take the firm action that would be required to prevent such incidents. He may estimate that if

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he attempted to do so he would risk losing control over the armed forces.

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President Balaguer frankly told the consul on 21 August that he had been trying to deport the leaders of the pro-Castro Dominican Popular Movement, but that the military had blocked the action for "tactical" reasons, evidently in the belief that having a Communist threat in the Dominican Republic would accelerate US and OAS support for the regime. The late dictator tried this tactic on several occasions.

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

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The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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The Secretary of the Treasury

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The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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